

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 20, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 303

NSC, OSD Reviews Completed

To: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, US SALT Delegation

Subject: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285 and NSDM 301.

1. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the US is willing to ban the development, testing, and deployment of the following systems:
 - Land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
 - Ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 600 km carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
 - Installations for launching ballistic missiles which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor, including territorial seas or inland waters.
2. The Delegation should propose the following definition of a cruise missile:
 - A cruise missile is any armed, unmanned, self-propelled, guided missile which sustains flight through use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range.
3. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article VII of the Joint Draft Text:
 - a. The limitation provided for in Article III of this agreement shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers.

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger


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b. The parties agree that:

- (1) There shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for heavy ICBMs.
- (2) Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.
- (3) Operational ICBM and SLBM launchers used for testing or training shall be considered operational launchers.

In discussing the proposed language for Article VII, the Delegation should indicate that it is the US interpretation of Article VII that all operational launchers, wherever located, should be counted in the 2400 aggregate. The Delegation should also state that in the US view an increase of 15% would constitute a "significant increase" within the meaning of paragraph 2a of Article VII and solicit a Soviet response to this statement.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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